Extension of the Scope - State v. Miller

The Utah Court of Appeals recently released its opinion in State v. Miller, which is a case about extending the scope of a traffic stop.

Facts:

Defendant was stopped for going 70 mph in a 65 mph zone, a fact that the Trooper acknowledged he usually does not stop people for, but will many times on drivers with out of state plates due to possible drug trafficking activity. Trooper asked Defendant to come back to the patrol car with him. Trooper stated he does this about 90% of the time for two purposes: 1- sometimes he needs additional information to process the stop and this takes away the need to walk back and forth between vehicles; and 2- so Trooper can potentially gain additional reasonable suspicion while actively filling out the citation. Defendant had a noticeable limp as he walked back to Trooper's car, but did not take an "excessive amount of time." After Defendant got into Trooper's car, Trooper asked Defendant, "What'd you do to your ankle?" Trooper walked around to his side of the car after Defendant's response.

Over the next 7 minutes the two conversed about things other than the stop, but Trooper was actively filling out the citation this entire time. Most of the small talk was initiated by Defendant during this period. Trooper had finished all but one portion of the citation before asking dispatch to run a records check on Defendant. Trooper deployed a K9 while waiting for the records check, including a Triple I to come back. About 60 seconds after the dispatch, but before dispatch reported back the records check, the K9 alerted to the presence of a controlled substance. It was "several minutes" after the alert that dispatch finally reported back the criminal history check.  71 pounds of marijuana were found in the car and Defendant was charged with Possession with intent to distribute, along with the speeding violation. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence based upon the extension of the scope of the stop.

The question addressed at the district court level was whether the unrelated investigations, including the some of the questioning not related to the speeding violation and the dog sniff, extended the scope of the stop for speeding. The district court denied the motion to suppress, Defendant pleaded guilty and appealed based upon both the Utah and United States constitutions. The court of appeals noted that the state constitutional argument was not sufficiently briefed, so the analysis proceeded based upon the federal issues only.

Issues:

Defendant argued that Trooper illegally extended the scope of the stop in the following three ways: 1- Asking defendant to walk back to the patrol car; 2- engaging him in unrelated questioning before and during the citation process; and 3- waiting to run a criminal history check until later in the stop.

Asking Defendant to Walk Back to Patrol Car:

It is long established case law that an officer may ask occupants of vehicles to exit for officer safety purposes. Courts have long held that traffic stops are "especially fraught with danger to police officers" and "an officer may take certain negligible burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely." (internal cites omitted) The court held that the additional request to come back and sit in the patrol car follows this same line of reasoning, and does not require any further reasonable articulable suspicion.

Unrelated Questioning:

The court of appeals acknowledged the Supreme Court has held that officers may ask questions unrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop. So the ultimate question here is not whether the questioning is always related to the scope of the stop, but if it adds time to the stop. The court acquiesced that there was a de minimis extension in the time it would have taken to complete the stop if some of the questioning would not have happened. We have previous case law stating that even de minimis extension after the scope of the stop is finished. The Court here makes the distinction of when the de minimis extension takes place. Here, this was while the citation process was being completed, whereas prior cases the de minimis extension took place after the stop had been completed. This is an important distinction for this issue, and the court held that Trooper's unrelated questioning did not illegally extend the scope of the stop.

Records Check:

Defendant argued that Trooper's waiting to ask for the record check until that portion of the citation process was just an attempt to get "bonus time" to do other things while dispatch was conducting the criminal history check. Defendant argued that this needs to take place at the beginning so dispatch can be doing the records check while Trooper was filling out the citation. While the court agreed that there could be more efficient ways of completing the citation process, the ultimate issue is whether Trooper "pursued his investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner, not whether the investigation may have been accomplished by a less intrusive means." The court held that Trooper's actions were diligent, and even more important under a 4th Amendment analysis, that they were reasonable. As such, the dog sniff while waiting on the records check results to come back was permissible. Importantly on this issue, the court uses language and other decisions to say that a background check is a "mission-related activity," it could not unlawfully prolong the stop regardless of the order an officer completes each task. This is not new language, but reinforces what was existing in case law and is helpful for officers.

Ultimately, the court rejected all of Defendant's arguments and affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress. The dissent in this case is worth reading, but seems to ignore several prior precedents in the analysis. It seems the dissent felt this stop was simply a pretext stop and that should not be allowed, even though our courts have rejected that principle pretty clearly.

The full decision can be found here: State v. Miller

GRAMA and Running License Plates

"May a police officer, without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, run a license plate check on a passing vehicle?"

That is a question that has been argued in justice and district courts all around Utah for several years now. This issue stemmed originally from a ruling out of the West Valley Justice Court saying that an officer running a license plate without already having reasonable suspicion was a violation of privacy under GRAMA, and the argument spread quickly throughout the state. Almost every court where this was argued around the state ruled in favor of the government, but, until now we never had a case go up on appeal above the district court level to confirm the legality of such police action. Well, now we do! And as expected, the ruling is in the government's favor. Officers may, without reasonable suspicion, run a license plate and complete vehicle and driver license record checks on passing vehicles.

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State v. Oryall

Oryall was driving on State Road 198 in Payson when she passed an officer on the side of the road that was running licence plate checks on passing cars. Officer ran Oryall's plate through the government-managed electronic database and revealed Oryall as the registered owner. Officer then ran Oryall's driver license record, discovering she had a suspended driver license. After watching the car park at a nearby convenience store, officer watched the driver got out and walk into the convenience store, allowing the officer to confirm that the person driving the car was in fact Oryall. Oryall came back out and resumed driving, and officer initiated a traffic stop. Oryall exhibited many clues of impairment and after completing field sobriety tests, Oryall was arrested for DUI and other related crimes.

Oryall filed a motion to suppress the evidence based upon the Utah Constitution and her expectation of privacy in motor vehicle and driver records, and that GRAMA recognized that expectation of privacy. Oryall's argument contended that to overcome that reasonable expectation of privacy that an officer must possess reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to accessing the records, even though those records are kept by governmental agencies. The district court denied her motion, and Oryall appealed.

Oryall relied upon a state constitutional argument only since federal courts "have unanimously determined that law enforcement officers may conduct warrantless and suspicionless checks on passing motorists' vehicle registration and driver's license information." (quoted from State v. Oryall, see United States v. Miranda-Sotolongo, 827 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2016). In addition to recognizing the federal law relating to this argument, the Court in Oryall stated it was aware of no other state that has interpreted their own constitution to require a warrant or reasonable suspicion before running similar vehicle record checks.

Oryall pointed the court to the fact that, on rare occasion, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted Utah's constitution to apply more broad protections from search and seizure than the federal courts have in interpreting the federal constitution. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and distinguished the case cited in support of Oryall's argument. The Court held that a person does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy against government intrusion to a record that the same government they are attempting to prevent intruding already lawfully possesses the record itself.

Oryall's next argument was around GRAMA itself. Oryall argued that the legislative intent section of GRAMA recognized the citizenry's constitutional right to privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities. The Court points out, however, that this right to privacy is against the public accessing private information held by the government, not prohibiting the government from accessing information held by another governmental agency. The Court further notes that there are three separate subsections in GRAMA itself that specifically allow this exact sharing of information between governmental agencies to occur.

Ultimately the Court ruled that Oryall had failed to meet the required threshold showing that she even possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in her motor vehicle record, and therefore affirmed the decision to deny the motion to suppress made in the district court. We have been waiting for an appellate court to hear this matter for several years now as the overwhelming majority of justice and district courts around the state had ruled in the government's favor, with only a very small number recognizing the right to privacy under this GRAMA argument.

Here is a link to the opinion: State v. Oryall

Carpenter v. United States - Warrants for Historical Cell Site Data

Last week the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) decided what appears to be a landmark case regarding access to historical cell site data under the 4th Amendment. Justice Roberts authored the opinion for the Court, and formulated the issue in his opening statement: "This case presents the question whether the Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements." Below is a summary and link for the case.

Carpenter v. United States

Timothy Carpenter (Defendant) was involved in a string of armed robberies and burglaries throughout Ohio and Michigan. Seven of his confederates identified him at trial as not only being involved in the crimes, but the leader of the group. In addition to the testimony of his cohorts, the FBI had utilized orders under the Stored Communications Act (SCA). SCA permits the government to compel the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when it “offers specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought “are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” These reports gave historical location details about Defendant over an extended period of time, and put him in the locations of the crimes around the time they occurred. Defendant argued at trial, and on appeal, that the cell site data should be suppressed and excluded from trial since it was obtained without a warrant. The trial court denied the motion, and the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in holding that Defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in those records as he voluntarily shared that data with the cell phone carriers for communication purposes.

The Court, in coming to the conclusion that a warrant would be necessary under these facts, likened this type of data more to constant GPS surveillance than other types of information gathering techniques. In fact, the Court stated that this type of activity is likely even more intrusive than GPS tracking on a vehicle, since people regularly leave their vehicles, but almost always carry their cell phones with them. The Court also held that this type of information, namely the past history of cell sites, does not fall under the "third party doctrine," which allows the government to obtain records from third parties that possess and own the information about the subject. The SCOTUS holding here is simply that a person possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell site data.

There are 91 pages total in four different dissents written in the case by Justices Kennedy, Alito, Thomas, and Gorsuch. The case hinges upon the Court's hesitance to apply previous standards and precedent to developing technology that makes it easier for the government to monitor people's lives, movements, and activities. See the link below for the full opinion for more.

Carpenter v. United States

Byrd v. United States - Unauthorized drivers still possess expectation of privacy in rental cars

The Supreme Court of the United States recently released an opinion determining what, if any, reasonable expectation of privacy a driver of a rental car possesses when the driver is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement. The Court held that....

Below is a summary of the case and a link to the case for your review.

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Facts

Defendant, Terrence Byrd, drove with an acquaintance to a rental car company to rent a car. The acquaintance went inside and rented a vehicle. She did not list Byrd on the rental agreement as an authorized driver, and Byrd's relationship to the acquaintance did not qualify him as an authorized driver under the general provisions in the company's policy. Acquaintance left the building, handed the rental car keys directly to Byrd, and drove away in the car she arrived and Byrd leaving in the rental vehicle.

Byrd went home and put some personal effects in the trunk and began the nearly six hour drive to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Along the way he passed a Pennsylvania state trooper who was suspicious of the way Byrd was driving and that this was a rental, so he followed Byrd. A short time later he stopped Byrd for a possible traffic violation.

Byrd was "visibly nervous" and "was shaking and had a hard time obtaining his driver's licence" when the trooper spoke to him. Eventually Byrd produced an interim license and the rental agreement, admitting a friend had rented the car. Another trooper arrived and while the trooper 1 was processing the paperwork, trooper 2 was speaking with Byrd. Byrd again admitted a friend had rented the vehicle. Trooper 1 confirmed that Byrd was not on the rental agreement, and the two troopers concluded together that Byrd had no expectation of privacy in the vehicle. A search of Byrd's name revealed two actual names, one being an alias, and also that Byrd had a history of weapons and drug charges. He also had a warrant, but it stated that New Jersey did not want him arrested and extradited.

Troopers had Byrd exit the vehicle and asked if he had anything illegal in the car. Byrd said he did not, and troopers asked for consent to search. Byrd then admitted he had "a blunt" in the car and offered to get it for the troopers did not allow him to collect it, continuing to ask for consent to search the car. Troopers then informed Byrd that they did not need his consent because he was not on the rental agreement. Troopers then began to search the car, and first found body armor. They decided to take Byrd into custody, but he fled. Another trooper had arrived and the three of them pursued him and Byrd surrendered, admitting there was heroin in the car as well. Troopers collected 49 bricks of heroin from the trunk of the car.

While one of the troopers testified in pretrial proceedings that he had probable cause to search the vehicle based upon Byrd's actions and statements, but the federal district court denied, and the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, based solely on the issue of standing to challenge a search when one is not on the rental agreement.

SCOTUS granted cert to address the circuit split on that issue: Does a driver of a rental car have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car when he or she is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement? 

Analysis 

The basis of the government's argument in this case was that unauthorized drivers will never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car. The government further argued that because of the rental agreement being violated, they could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. The Court rejected this as too broad of a limit on the 4th Amendment, and said it would also be unreasonable to state that simply violating a rental agreement disqualified one's right to be free from unreasonable searches. The Court cited examples such as driving while using a handheld cell phone, or driving on non-paved surfaces as violations of the rental agreement as well, yet nobody would argue those violations take away one's reasonable expectation of privacy. In short, a breach in contract is not sufficient to overcome the 4th Amendment.

The Court then turned to a lawful possession analysis. The government argued that Byrd used a strawman third party to rent the car because he knew his record would disqualify him, and therefore did not lawfully possess the car. However, this argument was not brought up at the District Court or Court of Appeals, and it was unclear from the record whether this action would be a violation of state law. Therefore, the Court refused to address this issue on appeal now, and part of the remand was to determine if Byrd lawfully possessed the car, or whether his subterfuge was akin to theft.

The Court held that while a person may be an unauthorized user and not on the rental agreement, if they are otherwise lawfully in possession of the rental car, they possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court remanded the case to answer two of the government's arguments: 1- One who intentionally uses a third party to procure a rental car by a fraudulent scheme for the purpose of committing a crime is no better suited than a car thief; and 2- that probable cause justified the search regardless of an unauthorized user's reasonable expectation of privacy. So while Byrd may have won the battle, it is still very possible that he may lose the war. It seems likely to me at least, that these two arguments will ultimately prevail once adequately addressed by the lower courts.

Here is a link to the full case, including two short concurring opinions that raise a couple other interesting questions: Byrd v. United States

State v. McLeod - Extending the Scope of the Stop

Recently the Court of Appeals reached a decision regarding the reasonable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of the stop. It is an interesting case where the Court reversed and suppressed the evidence based upon the district court's findings of fact at the trial level. The facts below are taken directly from the opinion, with analysis being my own. 

Facts

A police officer was patrolling 200 South 500 West in Salt Lake City when he noticed a vehicle parked in the median of the street. The officer watched as McLeod exited the vehicle and jaywalked across the street. McLeod approached three people, who pointed out that the officer was nearby. McLeod then walked around the corner, out of the officer's sight. The officer waited for McLeod to return to his vehicle.When McLeod returned, he got into his vehicle and pulled away from the median without signaling. At that point, the officer initiated a traffic stop. The officer approached McLeod's vehicle and requested his driver license, proof of insurance, and vehicle registration. When McLeod was unable to produce those documents, the officer asked for his name and other identifying information. The officer returned to his patrol car to complete a records check while a backup officer, who had arrived on the scene, watched McLeod. During the records check, McLeod continued “moving around quite a bit in his front seat.” The backup officer told McLeod to stop moving around, and he complied. The records check confirmed that McLeod had a valid driver license and that he did not have any outstanding warrants. The officer later testified that nothing in McLeod's record “raised concerns of violence” or suggested that the officer “should detain him further on ... any other matters.” 

The officer also acknowledged that, “at that point, it was either write the citation or give him a warning [for the traffic violation].” But the officer did not write McLeod a citation, give him a warning for any offense, or tell him that he was free to leave. Instead, the officer returned to McLeod's vehicle and asked whether “he had anything illegal in the car.” When McLeod said “No,” the officer asked if he could search the vehicle, and McLeod responded, “Sure.” As he prepared to step out of the car, McLeod reached underneath a pile of clothes on the passenger seat. Concerned that McLeod was reaching for a weapon, the officers ordered McLeod out of the vehicle and frisked him, which confirmed that McLeod did not have any weapons on his person. The officer then asked McLeod a second time whether there was anything illegal in the vehicle. This time, McLeod admitted that he had a syringe in a shoe inside the car. Approximately ten minutes had elapsed from the beginning of the traffic stop to the time that McLeod indicated that he had a syringe. During the ensuing search of McLeod's vehicle, the officer discovered a heroin-filled syringe and a black twist in the shoe and two more black twists in the center console. The officer believed that the twists contained heroin because, based on his training and experience, that was “the way [heroin] was packaged.”

Analysis 

The state argued that McLeod's prior suspicious conduct in a high crime area in combination with his behavior during the traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion to extend the scope of the stop. The state pointed specifically to McLeod's approaching three separate people and his abrupt departure around the corner once he realized police were present, McLeod's furtive movements during the traffic stop, and his presence in an area known to be high in drug-dealing activity as the factors establishing reasonable suspicion to extend the scope of the stop.

The Court pointed to the fact that the district court had not made any findings of fact regarding those instances, particularly no finding of fact that they were suspicious, and held that these actions in their totality did not constitute reasonable suspicion to extend the scope of the stop. 

It seems somewhat counter-intuitive that this would not be considered reasonable suspicion, particularly when the Court held that the initial stop was fine. You can read the full opinion and analysis here: State v. McLeod, 2018 UT App 51

What Works in Reducing Impaired Driving Fatalities?

Impaired driving kills approximately 10,000 people every year across the United States. While the fatal crashes come at a lower rate in Utah, we still lose far too many people to these incidents each year that seem to be entirely preventable. To reduce impaired driving fatalities, we have to reduce impaired driving. So how do we do that? This is ultimately the million dollar question, isn't it?

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) recently tasked the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine to answer that exact question. This comprehensive review produced a nearly 500 page report containing a litany of recommendations for both state and federal governments to adopt.

One recommendation that I will highlight as it is relevant to the times is that this report is recommending that all states and the federal government adopt a per se BAC threshold of .05. We know that Utah already adopted this standard, and unless something changes in our current legislative session, this law will go into effect on December 30, 2018. The evidence showing that a person is not safe to operate a vehicle at .05 BAC is pretty significant. In fact, research has shown that a person's crash risk doubles for every .02% one goes above .00 BAC. The report details results from all around the globe where governments have reduced the per se threshold to .05 (or lower). The data is pretty staggering.

Impaired driving is a serious public safety issue. Research shows that police officers catch a very small amount of those that are actually impaired on our roadways. We will not be able to arrest our way out of this problem, and we certainly are not capable of prosecuting our way out of it either. Below you will find a full list of the recommendations made by the report, and also a link that will take you to the website that contains the full report, along with other information surrounding this important topic. As always, please contact me if you have any questions or concerns in your impaired driving cases.

-Tyson

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National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine: Getting to Zero Alcohol-Impaired Driving Fatalities

THE COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS

Federal and state governments should increase alcohol taxes significantly.

State and local governments should take appropriate steps to limit or reduce alcohol availability, including restrictions on the number of on- and off-premises alcohol outlets, and the days and hours of alcohol sales.

Federal, state, and local governments should adopt and/or strengthen laws and dedicate enforcement resources to stop illegal alcohol sales (i.e., sales to already-intoxicated adults and sales to underage persons).

Federal, state, and local governments should use their existing regulatory powers to strengthen and implement standards for permissible alcohol marketing content and placement across all media, establish consequences for violations, and promote and fund counter-marketing campaigns.

State governments should enact per se laws for alcohol-impaired driving at 0.05 percent blood alcohol concentration (BAC). The federal government should incentivize this change, and other stakeholders should assist in this process. The enactment of 0.05 percent per se laws should be accompanied by media campaigns and robust and visible enforcement efforts.

States and localities should conduct frequent sobriety checkpoints in conjunction with widespread publicity to promote awareness of these enforcement initiatives.

When the Driver Alcohol Detection System for Safety (DADSS) is accurate and available for public use, auto insurers should provide policy discounts to stimulate the adoption of DADSS. Once the cost is on par with other existing automobile safety features and is demonstrated to be accurate and effective, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) should make DADSS mandatory in all new vehicles.

Municipalities should support policies and programs that increase the availability, convenience, affordability, and safety of transportation alternatives for drinkers who might otherwise drive. This includes permitting transportation network company ride sharing, enhancing public transportation options (especially during nighttime and weekend hours), and boosting or incentivizing transportation alternatives in rural areas).

Every state should implement DWI courts, guided by the evidence-based standards set by the National Center for DWI Courts, and all DWI courts should include available consultation or referral for evaluation by an addiction-
trained clinician.

All health care systems and health insurers should cover and facilitate effective evaluation, prevention, and treatment strategies for binge drinking and alcohol use disorders including screening, brief intervention, and referral to treatment, cognitive behavioral therapy, and medication-assisted therapy.

All states should enact all-offender ignition interlock laws to reduce alcohol-impaired driving fatalities. An ignition interlock should be required for all offenders with a BAC above the limit set by state law. To increase effectiveness, states should consider increased monitoring periods based on the offender’s BAC or past recidivism.

NHTSA should ensure that timely standardized data on alcohol-impaired driving, crashes, serious injuries, and fatalities are collected and accessible for evaluation, research, and strategic public dissemination and that data from other government agencies and private organizations are included as needed. NHTSA should explore the usefulness of big data for inclusion in alcohol-impaired driving information strategies.

To facilitate surveillance of alcohol-impaired driving that is timely, ongoing, concise, and actionable, NHTSA should convene a diverse group of stakeholders that includes academic researchers, law enforcement, city and state public health, transportation sector, and other federal agency representation to create and maintain a metrics dashboard, and publish brief, visually appealing quarterly and annual national and state-by-state reports that analyze and
interpret progress in reducing alcohol-impaired driving.

NHTSA, other federal partners, and private funding sources free of conflicts of interest should support training, technical assistance, and demonstration projects in the implementation of effective strategies, including policy changes, for reducing alcohol-impaired driving.
NHTSA should create a federal interagency coordinating committee to develop and oversee an integrated strategy for reducing alcohol-impaired driving, assure collaboration, maintain accountability, and share information among organizations committed to reducing alcohol-impaired driving.

The National Conference of State Legislatures should draft model legislation to provide benchmarks for states that seek to reduce alcohol-impaired driving fatalities.

State v. Jervis - Reasonable Suspicion for a Stop

The Utah Court of Appeals recently released its opinion in State v. Jervis. This case has some great analysis for when reasonable suspicion exists for an investigatory detention. If you have not read it, I suggest you do so as there is great language that is helpful for close calls in cases where the defense is challenging the reason for the stop.

The facts of the case are as follows: A Salt Lake City police officer ("Officer") was patrolling an area he knew to have a high level of criminal activity. This area consisted of a motel adjacent to or near the freeway with other hotel parking lots surrounding it. Officer noticed a Honda Civic parked in the stall furthest away from the motel's available rooms, backed into the stall, with the lone occupant sitting in the driver's seat. Officer noted that there was no front license plate affixed and there were over-sized bolts on the front bumper where the license plate should be attached. Because this was a high crime area, and based upon his training and experience that Honda Civics were a model frequently stolen, combined with there being no front license plate attached, Officer approached the Honda and parked his patrol vehicle at a 45 degree angle in front of the Honda, essentially blocking it from leaving and initiating a stop.

During the stop, Officer noted the front license plate on the floor of the passenger seat. He also ran a records check and found out the driver ("Jervis") had warrants for his arrest. An initial search incident to arrest did not result in any illegal substances, but a subsequent search of the vehicle and Jervis resulted in the discovery of three different controlled substances. Jervis was eventually charged with two class B misdemeanor counts of possession and one count of 3rd degree felony possession. Jervis entered a Sery plea to the felony count of possession after the District Court denied his motion to suppress and appealed. His argument focused upon the issue of no reasonable suspicion for the detention.

The Court of Appeals rejected Jervis's arguments, and affirmed the District Court's decision to deny the motion to suppress. There are a few things that are particularly important in this case.

First, the Court's focus on the standard for reasonable suspicion is helpful in any case where the justification for the stop seems like a close call. The decision mentions multiple times that officers are not required to rule out innocent conduct or establish the likelihood of criminal activity to the point they are required with probable cause. And maybe more importantly, the decision reiterates the principle that reasonable suspicion falls "considerably short" of even the preponderance of the evidence standard.

Next, the decision helps reiterate the point that officers do not actually have to observe a person commit a crime to make an investigatory detention. They only have to have reasonable suspicion that a crime has occurred, or is about to occur. In coming to this conclusion, the Court reminds us that common sense rules the day, and reasonable inferences on the officer's part are okay.

Finally, the Court does an analysis based upon the argument that state code prevents and officer making a stop for the lack of a front license plate, since that offense is only a secondary offense under Utah Code. This provision is particularly helpful for other cases, particularly anyone still seeing the GRAMA issue for justifying stops. The Court cites both Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) and  State v. Harker, 2010 UT 56, 240 P.3d 780 to reject this claim. These cases essentially hold the principle that states are not allowed to create Fourth Amendment protections via statute. And that while statutes may prevent certain types of arrests, so long as there is probable cause, a defendant may not avail himself of Fourth Amendment protections based upon the statutory provisions alone. Jervis tried arguing that those cases do not apply since this was not a probable cause issue, but a reasonable suspicion issue. The Court of Appeals summarily rejected that argument.

There is some really helpful language in this opinion for reasonable suspicion arguments. You can find the full opinion here: State v. Jervis


Tyson