State v Lyman - Automobile Homicide Negligence Analysis

 The Utah Court of Appeals recently ruled in an automobile homicide appeal, analyizing sufficienty of the evidence and also jury instructions. (At the time of the offense, the name of the offense had changed to "negligently operating a vehicle causing death," but has since changed back to the more fluid "automobile homicide," so I use the easier and current term here.) 

This case has quality analysis on competing evidence and even dueling experts. Essentially, just becase a defendant has an expert and presents a decent defense does not mean it's impossible for a jury to find that person guilty. 

The more relevant analysis for future cases is the jury instruction discussion. While the court held that it was likely a faulty jury instruction on the speeding count which may have influenced the negligence analysis as defendent claimed, it held it was harmless error as the state did not, in fact, make those arguments. There was plenty of other evidence pointing to the negligence which the state focused, so the erroneous jury instructions were harmless error. Pay close attention to section III of the argument for future jury instructions. The court has indicated that the "prima facia" language in a speeding jury instruction is problematic, even though it is contained in the statute. 

You may read the full opinion here: State v. Lyman. 

Prosecutor Consent Law - DUI Pleas

The Utah Supreme Court recently addressed the "prosecutor consent law" for DUI pleas contained in 41-6a-513. 

The case hinged on a seperations of powers constitutional challenge to the statute when a DUI defendant was trying to plead guilty to a class B misdemeanor DUI charge when further information was obtained after charging that another person involved in the crash had sustained injuries. Defendant was trying to get the benefit of the class B misdemeanor filing knowing that enhanced charges were in his future. This is the exact reason this "prosecutor consent law" exists; to prevent these races to the justice court to bar future proper charging of a defendant under double jeopardy protection. 

The Court did not reach the constitutionality of the statute because it held that even if they did make that finding, it was not clear it would give defendant any relief being sought and therefore they declined to grant extraordinary relief. 

If you ever find your court trying to subvert the statute requiring prosecutors to agree to a DUI plea in open court, this case may be helpful to you. 

You may read the full opinon here: Adams v. Hon. Robison.