Helpful Drugged Driving Opinion

The Ohio Supreme Court recently issued a ruling that I believe is a great example prosecutors can look to in difficult DUI cases. Check out the summary below that was completed by Holly Reese, TSRP in Ohio, and Beth Barnes, TSRP in Arizona. Notice especially that the conviction was secured without a toxicology result. This is a fantastic example of a prosecutor utilizing all the resources available to get a conviction in a difficult DUI case. The training and experience of so many of our officers are powerful tools in our cases. Are we utilizing these tools effectively? Or are we simply hitching our wagons to a chemical test result? The reasoning in this opinion is helpful on many fronts to us here in Utah. Let me know if you have any questions or want to talk about these issues in more detail.

-Tyson

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State v. Richardson, No. 2016-Ohio-8448, 2016 WL 7645344, a case of interest recently issued by the Ohio Supreme Court.

In a 4-3 decision, the court held expert testimony is not required for a conviction of driving under the influence of a drug.  Evidence establishing the defendant’s impairment, together with his admission to taking hydrocodone, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. 

This opinion may be useful for its persuasive value in any state that does not have a published opinion addressing the necessity of expert testimony in a DUI drug case.  Further, even though it was not the focus of the opinion, it is worth noting that there were no blood or urine toxicology results in this case.  Nonetheless, the evidence was sufficient for conviction.  This is a good example of the fact that we prove impairment in a DUI drug case through the officer and that thorough documentation of impairment and the use of the SFSTs leads to and sustains convictions.

Here is a summary of the opinion.

FACTS:  Richardson rear-ended a vehicle stopped at a red light.  When the driver of the other vehicle approached, she noted his speech was slurred and that Richardson dropped all his documents as he attempted to exchange information.  After the victim returned to her car, she felt it move as though nudged by Richardson’s truck.

When the investigating officer arrived, he noticed Richardson had slurred speech and that he singed his hair as he tried to light a cigarette.  The officer had to put Richardson’s truck in park because Richardson had failed to do so.  When asked to exit the truck, Richardson slid out.  He failed the SFSTs, admitted he had taken pain medication (30 milligrams of hydrocodone) and refused the offered blood test. 

During trial, Richardson testified he had a prescription for hydrocodone acetaminophen, but claimed he had taken the medication two days before the collision.  He asserted he was merely suffering from withdrawal at the time of the collision and that he had been taking the hydrocodone for so long that he no longer experienced its side effects.  A doctor who specialized in chemical dependence testified Richardson’s behavior on the date of violation was consistent with the effects of hydrocodone withdrawal but inconsistent with impairment.  The trial judge convicted Richardson who later appealed.

ANALYSIS AND HOLDING:  Finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the 2^nd District Court who had vacated the conviction.  The Ohio Supreme Court found the evidence established Richardson ingested hydrocodone which impaired his driving. 

Richardson’s admissions proved he had ingested hydrocodone.  Additionally, the evidence of impairment was “significant and sufficient.” This included evidence that Richardson rear-ended another vehicle, had slurred speech, slid out of his truck, and singed his hair while attempting to light a cigarette.  He exhibited 7 of 8 cues on the walk and turn and showed signs of impairment on the one leg stand.  Based on his experience, the officer testified it was his belief Richardson was under the influence of narcotics.

The court specifically noted that “When the effects of a drug are sufficiently well known - as they are with hydrocodone - expert testimony linking ingestion of the drug with indicia of impairment is unnecessary. “In this case, the testimony of the experienced, well-trained officer was sufficient lay testimony connecting Richardson’s impairment to the hydrocodone.”