Byrd v. United States - Unauthorized drivers still possess expectation of privacy in rental cars

The Supreme Court of the United States recently released an opinion determining what, if any, reasonable expectation of privacy a driver of a rental car possesses when the driver is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement. The Court held that....

Below is a summary of the case and a link to the case for your review.

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Facts

Defendant, Terrence Byrd, drove with an acquaintance to a rental car company to rent a car. The acquaintance went inside and rented a vehicle. She did not list Byrd on the rental agreement as an authorized driver, and Byrd's relationship to the acquaintance did not qualify him as an authorized driver under the general provisions in the company's policy. Acquaintance left the building, handed the rental car keys directly to Byrd, and drove away in the car she arrived and Byrd leaving in the rental vehicle.

Byrd went home and put some personal effects in the trunk and began the nearly six hour drive to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Along the way he passed a Pennsylvania state trooper who was suspicious of the way Byrd was driving and that this was a rental, so he followed Byrd. A short time later he stopped Byrd for a possible traffic violation.

Byrd was "visibly nervous" and "was shaking and had a hard time obtaining his driver's licence" when the trooper spoke to him. Eventually Byrd produced an interim license and the rental agreement, admitting a friend had rented the car. Another trooper arrived and while the trooper 1 was processing the paperwork, trooper 2 was speaking with Byrd. Byrd again admitted a friend had rented the vehicle. Trooper 1 confirmed that Byrd was not on the rental agreement, and the two troopers concluded together that Byrd had no expectation of privacy in the vehicle. A search of Byrd's name revealed two actual names, one being an alias, and also that Byrd had a history of weapons and drug charges. He also had a warrant, but it stated that New Jersey did not want him arrested and extradited.

Troopers had Byrd exit the vehicle and asked if he had anything illegal in the car. Byrd said he did not, and troopers asked for consent to search. Byrd then admitted he had "a blunt" in the car and offered to get it for the troopers did not allow him to collect it, continuing to ask for consent to search the car. Troopers then informed Byrd that they did not need his consent because he was not on the rental agreement. Troopers then began to search the car, and first found body armor. They decided to take Byrd into custody, but he fled. Another trooper had arrived and the three of them pursued him and Byrd surrendered, admitting there was heroin in the car as well. Troopers collected 49 bricks of heroin from the trunk of the car.

While one of the troopers testified in pretrial proceedings that he had probable cause to search the vehicle based upon Byrd's actions and statements, but the federal district court denied, and the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, based solely on the issue of standing to challenge a search when one is not on the rental agreement.

SCOTUS granted cert to address the circuit split on that issue: Does a driver of a rental car have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car when he or she is not listed as an authorized driver on the rental agreement? 

Analysis 

The basis of the government's argument in this case was that unauthorized drivers will never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car. The government further argued that because of the rental agreement being violated, they could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. The Court rejected this as too broad of a limit on the 4th Amendment, and said it would also be unreasonable to state that simply violating a rental agreement disqualified one's right to be free from unreasonable searches. The Court cited examples such as driving while using a handheld cell phone, or driving on non-paved surfaces as violations of the rental agreement as well, yet nobody would argue those violations take away one's reasonable expectation of privacy. In short, a breach in contract is not sufficient to overcome the 4th Amendment.

The Court then turned to a lawful possession analysis. The government argued that Byrd used a strawman third party to rent the car because he knew his record would disqualify him, and therefore did not lawfully possess the car. However, this argument was not brought up at the District Court or Court of Appeals, and it was unclear from the record whether this action would be a violation of state law. Therefore, the Court refused to address this issue on appeal now, and part of the remand was to determine if Byrd lawfully possessed the car, or whether his subterfuge was akin to theft.

The Court held that while a person may be an unauthorized user and not on the rental agreement, if they are otherwise lawfully in possession of the rental car, they possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court remanded the case to answer two of the government's arguments: 1- One who intentionally uses a third party to procure a rental car by a fraudulent scheme for the purpose of committing a crime is no better suited than a car thief; and 2- that probable cause justified the search regardless of an unauthorized user's reasonable expectation of privacy. So while Byrd may have won the battle, it is still very possible that he may lose the war. It seems likely to me at least, that these two arguments will ultimately prevail once adequately addressed by the lower courts.

Here is a link to the full case, including two short concurring opinions that raise a couple other interesting questions: Byrd v. United States

State v. McLeod - Extending the Scope of the Stop

Recently the Court of Appeals reached a decision regarding the reasonable suspicion necessary to extend the scope of the stop. It is an interesting case where the Court reversed and suppressed the evidence based upon the district court's findings of fact at the trial level. The facts below are taken directly from the opinion, with analysis being my own. 

Facts

A police officer was patrolling 200 South 500 West in Salt Lake City when he noticed a vehicle parked in the median of the street. The officer watched as McLeod exited the vehicle and jaywalked across the street. McLeod approached three people, who pointed out that the officer was nearby. McLeod then walked around the corner, out of the officer's sight. The officer waited for McLeod to return to his vehicle.When McLeod returned, he got into his vehicle and pulled away from the median without signaling. At that point, the officer initiated a traffic stop. The officer approached McLeod's vehicle and requested his driver license, proof of insurance, and vehicle registration. When McLeod was unable to produce those documents, the officer asked for his name and other identifying information. The officer returned to his patrol car to complete a records check while a backup officer, who had arrived on the scene, watched McLeod. During the records check, McLeod continued “moving around quite a bit in his front seat.” The backup officer told McLeod to stop moving around, and he complied. The records check confirmed that McLeod had a valid driver license and that he did not have any outstanding warrants. The officer later testified that nothing in McLeod's record “raised concerns of violence” or suggested that the officer “should detain him further on ... any other matters.” 

The officer also acknowledged that, “at that point, it was either write the citation or give him a warning [for the traffic violation].” But the officer did not write McLeod a citation, give him a warning for any offense, or tell him that he was free to leave. Instead, the officer returned to McLeod's vehicle and asked whether “he had anything illegal in the car.” When McLeod said “No,” the officer asked if he could search the vehicle, and McLeod responded, “Sure.” As he prepared to step out of the car, McLeod reached underneath a pile of clothes on the passenger seat. Concerned that McLeod was reaching for a weapon, the officers ordered McLeod out of the vehicle and frisked him, which confirmed that McLeod did not have any weapons on his person. The officer then asked McLeod a second time whether there was anything illegal in the vehicle. This time, McLeod admitted that he had a syringe in a shoe inside the car. Approximately ten minutes had elapsed from the beginning of the traffic stop to the time that McLeod indicated that he had a syringe. During the ensuing search of McLeod's vehicle, the officer discovered a heroin-filled syringe and a black twist in the shoe and two more black twists in the center console. The officer believed that the twists contained heroin because, based on his training and experience, that was “the way [heroin] was packaged.”

Analysis 

The state argued that McLeod's prior suspicious conduct in a high crime area in combination with his behavior during the traffic stop gave rise to reasonable suspicion to extend the scope of the stop. The state pointed specifically to McLeod's approaching three separate people and his abrupt departure around the corner once he realized police were present, McLeod's furtive movements during the traffic stop, and his presence in an area known to be high in drug-dealing activity as the factors establishing reasonable suspicion to extend the scope of the stop.

The Court pointed to the fact that the district court had not made any findings of fact regarding those instances, particularly no finding of fact that they were suspicious, and held that these actions in their totality did not constitute reasonable suspicion to extend the scope of the stop. 

It seems somewhat counter-intuitive that this would not be considered reasonable suspicion, particularly when the Court held that the initial stop was fine. You can read the full opinion and analysis here: State v. McLeod, 2018 UT App 51