Saving Statute and Drugged Driving Recodification

 The Utah Supreme Court recently issued a ruling on an important issue for driving with a measurable controlled substance (DMCS) cases. To understand the court's decision, we have to understand how we got here. 

Prior to 2022, Utah had multiple areas of the code where a person could be charged when operating a motor vehicle under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol and causing serious bodily injury or death. The level of the offense was different based upon the substance, and could be somewhat confusing as to what level of offense to charge and which section of the code is appropriate. In the 2022 legislative session, a group of stakeholders set out to simply and consolidate all these offenses into clear and consistent code sections centrally located together. 

This effort was not controversial and was supported across the board by stakeholders, including prosecutors and defense attorneys. The intent was not to decriminalize any behavior. The goal was simply to put all the similar statutes in the same code sections and make penalties consistent across the board. 

This brings us to State v. Cooke. Cooke was charged with an offense in 2016 under the old code sections. Due to several continuances and delays, mostly due to the defense counsel requests and then covid, the case proceeded beyond the 2022 statutory change/consolidation. Cooke argued that his case must be dismissed because the crime he was charged with originally no longer existed. 

The state argued that Utah's "saving statute" applied and the prosecution could proceed under the old statute, even though it had been repealed. The Supreme Court wisely determined in the state's favor. This was an important decision as it holds up all cases filed prior to the 2022 change which was more akin to a recodification than a repeal of the statute. This case will be important if anyone tries to make a similar challenge to Cooke. 

You can view the entire opinion here: State v. Cooke. 

Unanimity in DUI Cases - State v. Cissel

 The Utah Court of Appeals recently released a case about jury unanimity in DUI cases. To be clear, this was an ineffective assistance of counsel case, not directly a unanimity case, but the analysis is the same. 

The question was essentially do DUI jury instructions need a special verdict form to ensure that the jury is unanimous on which prong of the DUI statute they are finding the defendant guilty. It is always good to keep up with the relevant caselaw on unanimity, and that has been developing and progressing steadily the last few years here in Utah. However, the Court of Appeals took a different line on this one. The ultimate holding was that counsel was not defficient in the case because the three prongs in the DUI statute are not separate offenses, but simply different means, or theories, in how one violates the DUI statute. 

An example quoted by the Court of Appeals is a murder case where a person both poisons and suffocates a victim. The jury does not have to be unanimous on whether it was the poison or the suffocation that killed the person, they just have to be unanimous that the defendant murdered the person. The means or theories can be different. 

It is always good to simplify a case as much as possible. In DUI cases I often advise to not include the prongs you are not going to be arguing in jury instructions just to simplify the case for the jury and not get into the weeds. The writing on the wall with unanimity had led me to believe that special verdict forms for DUI cases were a good idea. The Cissel case stands for that being unnecessary. You will have to determine what works best for you in each case, but the DUI statute under Cissel is not viewed as separate offenses or events, but simply alternate means or theories, and unanimity on a special verdict form as been trending in Utah case law does not apply. 

Of course, the Utah Supreme Court could take this case and go another way. There is also the chance that over time caselaw develops that take these arguments a different direction. However, as of this writing, that is the standard for analyzing these DUI cases under unanimity. 

You can read the full opinion here: State v. Cissel

State v. Fraughton

Recently the Court of Appeals decided a case that shows the importance of using special verdict forms in your DUI jury trial. 

There isn't really anything novel about the facts of the case or the decision made, but it is worth noting that the presence of a special verdict form is what the court relied upon to "easily dispatch" the defendant's arguments on appeal. 

It's a short case and one that is not groundbreaking, but it certainly is illustrative and gives guidance on good practices in DUI cases. You may read the full opinion on the link below. 

State v. Fraughton

Reasonable Suspicion and Citizen Informants in DUI Cases

The Utah Court of Appeals recently took up another case that reviewed when a citizen informant's tip can lead to reasonable suspicion for an officer to make a stop. 

The case is actually an ineffective assistance of counsel appeal, however, the court did the analysis to see if the motion defendant was saying counsel should have filed would have any merit or chance of being successful. 

A solid analysis of the factors involved with citizen informant tips and reasonable suspicion was done by the court. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument, stating that there was ample reasonable articulable suspicion for the detention in the case. The ultimate holding was as follows: 

"Before Officer approached Perkins, he received a communication from police dispatch that Witness had observed Perkins purchase beer, open a can while seated in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, and then drive onto the highway. Even though neither Witness nor Officer saw Perkins drive erratically or commit any traffic infractions, the facts relayed by Witness amply support the initial investigative detention because operating a vehicle containing an open container of alcohol or while drinking alcohol is a criminal offense under Utah law." 

You may review the whole opinion here: State v. Perkins

Failure to Stop at the Command of Police Officer - Mens Rea Reiterated

 The Court of Appeals released an opinion regarding Utah Code 76-8-305.5. This is a river floating case where a state parks ranger was attempting to stop some kayakers that were not wearing life jackets, however, the analyis applies to any other type of offense in this category, including some of our traffic offenses. 

The Court not only made clear that there is a mens rea to this offense, but that the fleeing must be to avoid an arrest. This case is a follow up to prior cases on these topics and reiterates the importance of establishing those elements that coincide with the mens rea requirements on this offense and also 41-6a-210. 

You can review the full opinion here: State v. Nelson

Officer's Prior Knowledge of Suspended DL Not Enough for RAS

The Utah Court of Appeals recently gave a ruling on the topic of whether an officer's prior knowledge that a driver had a suspended driver license was sufficient for reasonable articulable suspicion for a detention of that driver. 

The ultimate holding goes as follows: 

"This appeal asks us to decide whether an officer’s knowledge that Correa did not have a valid driver license two months before the stop created a reasonable suspicion that Correa still didn’t have a valid license and was therefore driving impermissibly. We hold that it did not."

It is important to note that at the evidentiary hearing, the officer testified that he learned that it was about two months prior that the defendant had been driving that truck with a suspended license, and maybe even three. This information was obtained via dispatch and also from other officers prior to the detention. There was no records check on the DL done, just information passed along from other people. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this can be an ongoing crime, but there has to be some temporal boundaries put on it, and based upon the information presented, it was not reasonable to assume that because someone was driving with a suspended DL two to three months prior, that it was reasonable articulable suspicion to assume the person was driving with a suspended DL on this occassion. The officer would need more. 

The Court contrasts this ruling to that in West Valley City v. Temblador-Topete, 2020 UT App 64, 463 P.3d 721 where an officer ran a plate and the insurance check came back "not found." This case was different because the insurance database was updated multiple times each month and the officer was doing a current check of that database. In the present case, this was just stale knowledge of a citation issued for driving on a suspended DL from months prior, without more. 

For a lawful detention to occur, officers will need more than just two to three month old information that a person was cited for driving on a suspended DL. See the full case here: State v. Correa. 

 Temblador-Topete

DUI Sentencing Decision - State v Timpson

The Utah Court of Appeals published an opinion regarding mandatory DUI sentencing. The case revolved around the question of whether "home confinement" met the mandatory jail provisions for people convicted three (or more) times within a ten-year period. 

The district court, over the objection from the State, sentenced defendant to serve the mandatory 62.5 days in home confinement with an ankle monitor. The State appealed and the Court of Appeals was persuaded by the State's argument that "home confinement" and "jail sentence" do not mean the same thing within the structure of the DUI statute, and therefore this was an illegal sentence. 

We often hear of courts around the state sentencing someone to home confinement instead of jail. There are provisions where this is contemplated and even allowed in the the statute. However, when there is a minimum jail sentence, this case makes clear that "home confinement" is not akin to jail, and courts may not impose those sentences in lieu of jail unless the statute allows for it. 

Here is a link to the decision: State v. Timpson